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Involuntary cognitions in everyday life 
Abstract 
Psychological research into spontaneous or intrusive cognitions has typically focused 
cognitions in one predefined domain, such as obsessional thoughts in OCD, intrusive 
memories in PTSD and depression, or involuntary autobiographical memories and 
daydreaming in everyday life. Such studies have resulted in a wealth of knowledge about 
these specific cognitions. However, by focusing on a predefined type of cognition, other 
subtypes of cognition that may co-occur can be missed. In this exploratory study we aimed to 
assess involuntary cognitions in everyday life without a predetermined focus on any specific 
subtype of cognition. Seventy unselected undergraduate student participants were 
administered a questionnaire that assessed the presence of any involuntary cognitions in the 
past month, their quality, type, content, and potential function. In addition, participants 
provided self-descriptions and completed measures of psychopathology. Content analyses 
showed that involuntary cognitions were common, predominantly visual in nature, emotional, 
often about social relationships, and often related to a hypothetical function of emotional 
processing. About two-thirds of the cognitions that participants reported were memories. 
Non-memories included daydreams, imaginary worst case scenarios, imaginary future events, 
hypothetical reconstructions, and ruminations. Memories and non-memories were strikingly 
similar in their subjective experience of content and emotionality. Negative (but not positive) 
self-descriptions were associated with negative involuntary cognitions and psychopathology, 
suggesting a link between involuntary cognitions and the self. Overall, the findings suggest 
that people experience a wide variety of subtypes of involuntary cognitions in everyday life. 
Moreover, the specific subtype of involuntary cognition appears to be less important than its 
valence or content, at least to the subjective experience of the individual.  
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Introduction 
 The field of psychology is characterised by a historical interest in the ways of the 
mind that appear to operate beyond voluntary control. For example, Sigmund Freud inspired 
an interest in subconscious processes that operate outside of our volition. Within the domain 
of psychopathology there has been a marked interest in involuntary phenomena such as 
psychotic hallucinations, obsessions, and traumatic flashbacks. In cognitive psychology, a 
growing body of research has investigated the occurrence of involuntary memories 
experienced in everyday life by individuals in the general population. These interests in 
involuntary processes across the clinical and cognitive psychology literatures have resulted in 
numerous scientific publications on specific forms of involuntary cognitions; i.e., thoughts, 
memories, or images that come into awareness in the absence of an intention of conjuring 
them. In this study we aimed to explore involuntary cognitions in everyday life using a 
bottom-up approach that is free from the restrictions of any theoretical framework or an a 
priori restrictive focus on any one subtype of involuntary cognition. 
 Several theorists and researchers have sought to describe and explore features of 
different forms of involuntary cognitions.  Some studies sought to compare involuntary 
cognitions between clinical and non-clinical populations, whereas others assessed their 
occurrence in everyday life. Below we describe the main observations that have emerged 
from this literature. Throughout this literature, many different terms have been used to 
describe the type of cognition that was studied (e.g., obsessions, intrusive thoughts, 
involuntary memories), although a definition of the adopted terms is not always provided.  
When reviewing the literature, we will describe the research findings using the original 
terminology adopted by the authors, and provide their definitions where available. In our own 
writing, we use the term ‘cognition’ as an umbrella term for memories, thoughts, and images. 
‘Memories’ refer to representations in autobiographical or semantic memory, ‘thoughts’ refer 
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to verbal thoughts, and ‘images’ refer to mental images from sensory modalities, most 
commonly visual. Thoughts and images may or may not be part of a memory representation.  
Involuntary autobiographical memories 
Involuntary negative autobiographical memories (often referred to in the literature as 
‘intrusive memories’ owing to the fact that they are distressing and intrude into consciousness 
unbidden) represent another type of involuntary cognition that has been investigated across a 
range of clinical disorders (Moulds & Holmes, 2011). Involuntary memories of negative 
events have been characterised and studied most extensively in posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), a clinical condition in which the reliving of one’s traumatic experience via the 
experience of recurrent and distressing memories is a key diagnostic criterion. Beyond PTSD, 
a growing evidence-base has documented the presence of involuntary negative memories, as 
well as other mental images, in a range of disorders, including panic disorder with 
agoraphobia (Day, Holmes, & Hackmann, 2004), social phobia (Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & 
Williams, 2003), bipolar disorder (Hales, Deeprose, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011) grief 
(Boelen & Huntjens, 2008) and depression (Newby & Moulds, 2011). However, although 
involuntary memories of negative events are reported by clinical samples, it is noteworthy 
that such memories are also reported by healthy individuals. For example, Newby and 
Moulds (2011) found that there was no significant difference between the proportions of 
currently depressed, formerly depressed and never-depressed individuals who had 
experienced an involuntary memory of a negative event in the previous week. Interestingly, 
the phenomenological experience of involuntary negative autobiographical memories (e.g., 
here and now quality, reliving) was strikingly similar across the three groups; however, 
currently depressed participants reported that their memories were more vivid, distressing, 
caused greater interference, and were associated with more sadness, helplessness and anger.  
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 Turning to studies on this topic outside of the clinical literature, Brewin, 
Christodoulides, and Hutchison (1996) assessed intrusive thoughts and intrusive 
autobiographical memories in a non-clinical sample. They defined intrusive thoughts as 
‘spontaneous, repetitive thoughts’ that interrupted ongoing activities and were hard to 
control, including images, impulses, or ideas. Intrusive memories were defined as memories 
of a specific event that interrupted daily activities and were hard to control. Participants were 
asked to report 5 intrusive memories and 5 intrusive thoughts and to rate their frequency in 
the past 2 weeks, as well as their level of (un)pleasantness. After controlling for the order of 
recall (i.e., memories first or thoughts first), the only difference that emerged was that 
thoughts tended to intrude more often than memories. 
Studies conducted outside of the laboratory have also investigated involuntary 
autobiographical memories in everyday life. For example, in an elaborate diary study, 
Berntsen (1996) asked 14 participants to record 50 involuntary memories with a maximum of 
2 memories per day. Participants answered a series of questions about each memory. In 
addition to the diary, participants were asked to estimate how many involuntary memories 
that they experienced on an average day. Participants reported that they experienced more 
than two involuntary memories per day, with 5 or 6 involuntary memories per day being the 
most typical estimate (range 3-20). Almost all memories were cued by triggers that shared 
salient features with the memory, with activities, objects, and people being the most common 
triggers. The valence of the memories was often congruent with participants’ mood state at 
the time of recall (see also Berntsen, 2001). Most of the memories were of unusual events, 
such as travelling abroad, parties, and romantic encounters, and memories were more often 
rated as positive rather than negative (see also Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). Participants reported 
an increase in positive mood as a result of recalling positive memories, and an increase in 
negative mood from recalling negative memories.  
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In another study, using Galton’s ‘memory walk’ as well as a word-cue task, Berntsen 
and Hall (2004) found that involuntary autobiographical memories, compared to voluntary 
memories, were more often of specific events as opposed to general events, and evoked more 
intense physical and emotional reactions. Using diary monitoring, Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008) found that participants experienced an average of 17 involuntary 
autobiographical memories over a period of one week.  
Involuntary ‘semantic’ memories 
In other studies researchers have examined instances in which semantic information 
comes to mind spontaneously. Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004) referred to these instances 
as ‘involuntary semantic memories’, and defined them as information without context and not 
related to the self, such as words, images, or songs. In a study with 205 psychology students, 
Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004; Study 3) administered a questionnaire that asked 
participants whether they had experienced involuntary semantic memories or ‘mind-
popping’. Of the participants, 84% indicated that they had at any time in their life 
experienced involuntary semantic memories. On average, participants estimated that these 
memories occurred between 1-2 and 3-4 times per week. The most frequent type of memory 
was a familiar tune popping into mind (indicated by 80% of participants).  
In a subsequent study (2004; Study 4), the authors compared involuntary semantic 
memories to involuntary autobiographical memories obtained from 50 psychology students. 
Participants were asked to record their involuntary autobiographical memories in a diary for 
one week, and their involuntary semantic ‘memories’ in a diary during another week (in 
counterbalanced order). Overall, 205 involuntary autobiographical memories and 74 
involuntary semantic memories were reported, which was a statistically significant difference 
in frequency. Similar to the earlier study, involuntary semantic memories were of words 
(61%), songs (27%), and images (12%). The authors did not report on the content of the 
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autobiographical memories. Both memory types were associated with relatively low levels of 
cognitive demand or concentration. Eighty percent of the involuntary autobiographical 
memories were associated with identifiable triggers, whereas this was only the case for 37% 
of the involuntary semantic memories, which was a statistically significant difference.  
Involuntary thoughts and images 
In an early paper on this topic, Rachman and de Silva (1978) reported the findings of 
two studies in which they assessed obsessions in a non-clinical and a clinical sample of 
‘obsessional patients’; i.e., individuals who sought clinical help for their obsessions. 
Obsessions were defined as ‘repetitive, unwanted, intrusive thoughts of internal origin’ 
(p.233). In the first study, 99 out of 124 non-clinical participants reported experiencing 
obsessional thoughts which they generally found easy to dismiss. Participants varied in the 
extent to which they rated their obsessions as tolerable. In the second study, information 
about obsessions was obtained from clinical and non-clinical participants. Blind raters with 
clinical experience were presented with the obsessions and asked to judge whether each one 
was reported by a clinical or non-clinical participant. The raters were fairly accurate in 
identifying the obsessions from the non-clinical participants as belonging to the non-clinical 
group. However, for the obsessions reported by clinical participants, raters did not do well in 
identifying these obsessions as belonging to the clinical group. This indicated that the content 
was quite similar in both groups. The obsessions reported by participants in the clinical group 
were experienced as longer, more frequent, more intense, and less acceptable and dismissible 
than the obsessions reported by participants in the non-clinical group. A later study by 
Salkovskis and Harrison (1984) replicated these results and further reported that participants’ 
discomfort with experiencing the obsessions was not related to obsession type (i.e., 
‘thoughts’ or ‘impulses’), but by the ease with which they could be dismissed. 
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Clark and De Silva (1985) asked non-clinical participants to rate a list of 6 depressive 
and 6 anxious cognitions (i.e., thoughts and images) on several dimensions. On average, 
participants reported that these cognitions occurred between twice a month and once a week. 
Anxious cognitions were rated as more emotionally intense than depressive cognitions, and 
the perceived controllability of both anxious and depressive cognitions predicted their 
frequency. In turn, frequency and emotional intensity (and disapproval for anxious cognitions 
only) predicted participants’ ratings of controllability. 
Beyond studies of involuntary memories and involuntary thoughts, researchers have 
investigated other intrusive cognitive phenomena and processes, including mind wandering 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood et al., 2013) and involuntary images of future 
events (‘flashforwards’; Holmes, Crane, Fennell, & Williams, 2007). 
The present study: Involuntary cognitions 
 Taken together, the studies outlined above provide valuable insights into an array of 
specific subtypes of involuntary cognitions that have been indexed across studies in the 
clinical and non-clinical literatures. Although investigating different types of involuntary 
cognition, a common feature of these studies is that the researchers identified a priori the 
subtype of involuntary cognition that was to be assessed. This may be an important limitation 
of the literature, because it may well be that people experience a range of different types of 
involuntary cognition. Focusing on one or two pre-determined subtypes of involuntary 
cognitions precludes the collection of data on other subtypes, and limits examinations of their 
relative importance in everyday life. That is, when wanting to determine the content of a fruit 
basket, one can decide to examine only cherries, or apples, or bananas. However, by doing 
so, the full content of the basket will never be known. In light of the abovementioned 
limitations, in this study we adopted a bottom-up approach as a means by which to take a first 
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step into exploring the full scope of involuntary cognitions in everyday life as they are 
experienced by an unselected sample of individuals in everyday life.  
Given that involuntary cognitions are accepted as a transdiagnostic occurrence across 
many disorders (e.g., Clark, 2004) we also explored the link between different types of 
involuntary cognitions that would emerge from our procedure, and psychopathology. The 
link between involuntary cognitions and psychopathology has been described in the Self-
Memory System Model (SMS; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). According to this model, 
the content of involuntary images should be related to psychopathology through the 
individual’s self-images. In order to explore this link, self-descriptions were also obtained. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy participants (58 females) were recruited from the student population of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen. Of these, 68 were undergraduate students, one was a graduate 
student, and one recently dropped out of their course. Participants received a €10 gift voucher 
for their participation, and ranged in age from 18 to 37 (M = 21.71, SD = 3.65).  
Involuntary Cognitions Questionnaire (ICQ) 
This self-report questionnaire was developed for the purpose of this study and the 
structure was based on earlier intrusive memory interviews (Ehlers, Hackmann, Steil, 
Clohessy, Wenninger, & Winter, 2002; Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004; 
Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007). First, participants read an introduction 
about involuntary cognitions, which read: 
Many people have the experience that in some moments a certain image, a 
certain thought, or a certain memory comes to mind, without them deliberately 
thinking about this. These can be positive as well as negative experiences. 
Someone who is in love, for example, sees the face of his or her loved one in their 
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mind time and time again. Someone who just experienced a car accident can keep 
seeing images of this experience in their mind. It is also possible that someone 
frequently sees a certain image in mind without exactly knowing where this is 
coming from. For example, someone can see an image of themselves completely 
alone, or trapped, or covered in germs. What is important here is that it is about 
images, thoughts, or memories that come in your mind spontaneously without you 
deliberately thinking about it. 
Participants were then asked whether they had experienced any such spontaneous images, 
thought or memories within the last month. If they had, participants were then asked to  
provide a detailed description of each image/thought/memory, that included its content (e.g., 
location, people, event, time), personal meaning, whether it was a memory of an actual event 
that they had experienced (yes/no), which (if any) emotions were associated with the 
involuntary cognition (fear, anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, or other), and how strongly 
they experienced any such emotions (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). After completing 
these questions, participants were asked whether they had experienced another spontaneous 
image, thought or memory within the past month. If so, the questions were repeated for this 
involuntary cognition. Participants were queried about a maximum of three involuntary 
cognitions. 
Coding scheme 
 The descriptions of the involuntary cognitions on the ICQ were coded independently 
by two raters (JK and JdB) on the characteristics of quality, type, content and, exploratory, 
possible function. Disagreements were resolved based on consensus after discussion. 
Quality. For quality, involuntary cognitions were classified according to their 
dominant quality (i.e., visual, verbal, emotional, or bodily sensation). These categories were 
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based on earlier studies on the qualities of intrusive memories (Ehlers et al., 2002; Hackmann 
et al., 2004; Speckens et al., 2007). Inter-rater agreement for quality was Ƙ = 0.472.  
Type. For type, participants’ response to the question about whether the involuntary 
cognition was a memory was used to identify spontaneous cognitions as either memories or 
non-memories. We initially intended to code non-memory cognitions according to existing 
categories (Blagov & Singer, 2004), but this resulted in a high number of unclassifiable 
cognitions. Accordingly, we classified non-memory involuntary cognitions into the following 
categories, on the basis of the coders’ ratings (i.e., JK and JdB; Ƙ = 0.666): daydream, worst 
case scenario, future event, hypothetical reconstruction (descriptions that fill gaps in the 
information that the participant has about a certain event), or rumination (recurring and 
extended verbal dwellings on a certain topic). 
Content. The content of the involuntary cognitions were coded into categories based 
on the classification systems developed to study self-defining memories (Thorne & McLean, 
2001; Blagov & Singer, 2004), on the basis that these categories were a good fit for the 
involuntary cognitions reported by participants (Ƙ = 0.714). These categories were as 
follows: relationships (emphasis is on a particular interpersonal relationship), life threatening 
events (plausible or actual death or threatened physical well-being of oneself or someone 
else), recreation/exploration (recreation, play or exploration or obstruction of these), 
achievement/mastery (the effortful striving towards or achievement of own, in-group, or 
significant others’ physical, material, social or spiritual goals), guilt/shame (issues of wrong 
or right, moral and ethical decisions), and not classifiable (not belonging to any of these 
categories). 
Function. The function categories were the most explorative of all categories. 
Although the literature of function of autobiographical memory is rather substantive (e.g., 
Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005), to our knowledge, no empirical research has been 
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published on functions of involuntary recall. According to a functional analysis of 
involuntary memories (Krans, Näring, Becker, & Holmes, 2010), the theoretical literature has 
suggested several possible ‘functions’. Therefore we borrowed from the autobiographical 
memory literature and the trauma literature to develop our ‘function’ categories. 
Emotional processing. First, according to the Self-Memory System of 
autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), involuntary memories persist 
when there is a discrepancy between an individual’s current state and desired state. The 
content of the involuntary memory provides information about the nature of this discrepancy. 
In that sense, involuntary memories ‘signal’ that something is wrong and action needs to be 
taken to reduce a certain unwanted discrepancy in the psychological self. The dual 
representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) suggests that in trauma, 
involuntary memories provide the information that is necessary to emotionally process the 
traumatic event. That is, a traumatic event often induces a discrepancy in the self (not 
dissimilar to the discrepancy put forward by the Self-Memory System) which can be dealt 
with by integrating all available information about the event with other knowledge in 
autobiographical memory. The theory proposes that highly emotional sensory information is 
by definition stored in involuntary memories, hence these memories provide the necessary 
information to successfully emotionally process the event. Taken together, these two models 
appear to converge on the idea that involuntary memories contain information that aids in the 
emotional processing of an emotional experience. Here, this category included involuntary 
cognitions that emphasised an event that still required closure, such as loss or holding a 
continuing grudge against someone about a wrong-doing in the past.   
Maintaining Social Relations. In the autobiographical memory literature it has been 
suggested that recalling (and sharing) autobiographical memories about significant others is 
involved in the maintenance of social relationships (Alea & Bluck, 2003). It is possible that 
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involuntary memories or other cognitions about significant others may be helpful for the 
same reason. That is, recurring involuntary cognitions about friends, family, or other social 
relations may stimulate the social relation by keeping the memory active. Therefore, 
involuntary cognitions that emphasised a specific relationship with a significant other were 
assigned to this category. 
Mood Repair. In the emotional memory and depression literature it has been found 
that individuals can improve a sad mood state by recalling positive autobiographical 
memories (e.g., Parrot & Sabini, 1990; Rusting & DeHart, 2000; Joormann & Siemer, 2004). 
Positive images especially are expected to have an effect on mood (Holmes & Mathews, 
2005). Hence, it is possible that spontaneous occurrences of positive images can have the 
same effect. Accordingly, involuntary cognitions that emphasised positive events or feelings 
were assigned to this category. 
Preparation. Thinking about or imagining future events has been implicated in the 
preparation for and likelihood of actual behaviour in the future (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; 
Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007). Similarly, involuntary cognitions about 
upcoming events may provide an opportunity for preparation and increase likelihood of 
future actions. Involuntary cognitions that predominantly emphasised upcoming events were 
assigned to this category. 
Warning signal. This may be the most concrete proposed function of involuntary 
memories, at least in the trauma literature. According to the warning signal hypothesis (e.g., 
Ehlers et al., 2002), involuntary memories of negative events come to mind in situations that 
resemble the physical characteristics of this earlier negative experience. In this way, the 
involuntary cognition functions as a ‘warning signal’ for potential danger in the present 
situation. Involuntary cognitions of negative events that were triggered by (a subjective sense 
of) similarity with the current situation were assigned to this category. We note one 
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difference between Ehlers et al.’s (2002) warning signal hypothesis and our conceptualisation 
of this function in the current study: the involuntary cognitions reported by participants in this 
study were not restricted to actual memories of a traumatic event. 
Self-descriptions 
 Self-descriptions were assessed with the Twenty-Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954; Horton, Moulin, & Conway, 2009). The TST assesses individual self-
descriptions as conceptualized in the SMS model by asking participants to complete twenty 
sentences starting with “I am…” (Horton et al., 2009). These descriptions were subsequently 
coded as positive (e.g., ‘I am smart’), negative (‘I am ugly’) and neutral (‘I am curious’) self-
descriptions (Ƙ = 0.785). 
Psychopathology 
 The Dutch version of the Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL-90; Ettema & Arrindell, 2003) 
is a 90-item self-report questionnaire that assesses perceived current physical and mental 
complaints aimed to reflect a general level of psychopathology. It is one of the most widely 
used screening questionnaires in Dutch mental health facilities. The total score is an indicator 
of general physical/mental dysfunction or ‘psychoneuroticism’. In addition, the following 
subscales can be identified: Somatization, Obsessive compulsive, Interpersonal sensitivity, 
Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic anxiety, Paranoid ideation, Psychoticism, and 
additional items. In a Dutch sample of individuals who contacted a mental health facility for 
the first time the internal consistency was α = 0.97 (Kloens, Barelds, Luteijn, & Schaap, 
2002).  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a testing cubicle in the lab of the Behavioural 
Science Institute. They completed a demographics questionnaire, the Involuntary Cognitions 
Questionnaire, followed by several measures that are not relevant to the present study 
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(assessing depression, anxiety, self-images and goals, and self-esteem) and the SCL-90. For 
more information on all measures that were included in the study please contact the 
corresponding author. Afterwards participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid. The entire 
session was usually completed within about 45 minutes. All questionnaires and tasks were 
completed on a PC using Inquisit version 2.0 (Millisecond Software, 2006). 
Results 
Frequency 
 In total 62 involuntary cognitions were reported. Of the 70 participants, 23 (32.86%) 
reported not having experienced any involuntary cognitions in the past month. A further 34 
participants (48.57%) reported one involuntary cognition, whereas 11 (15.71%) and two 
(2.86%) participants reported 2 and 3 involuntary cognitions, respectively. Thus, the majority 
of all participants, that is 67.14% of the present sample, recalled having experienced at least 
one involuntary cognition in the past month. 
Associated emotions and emotional intensity 
 For two participants no emotion data were recorded due to a technical error. On the 
ICQ participants were presented with the options ‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘sadness’, ‘disgust’, 
‘happiness’, or ‘other’. For 13 involuntary cognitions, the ‘other’ category was endorsed after 
which participants were asked to label the associated emotion. The ‘other’ category emotions 
were labelled by the participants as ‘distress’, ‘love’, ‘doubt’, ‘shame’, and ‘relaxed’. The 
large majority of involuntary cognitions were associated with either happiness (20; 32.26%) 
or sadness (15; 24.19%). These two categories far outweighed all other categories. Table 1 
presents the frequency with which each emotion was endorsed and the mean intensity score 
for each emotion.  
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Table 1. Frequencies of endorsed emotions for all involuntary cognitions in descending order 
and the mean emotional intensity per emotion. 
Emotion Frequency Intensity 
  M SD 
Happiness 20 6.05 0.74 
Sadness 15 5.67 0.90 
Fear 6 4.83 0.98 
Distress 6 5.00 0.84 
Anger 3 5.33 0.58 
Disgust 3 6.33 0.58 
Love 3 6.00 0.00 
Doubt 2 5.50 0.71 
Shame 1 6.00 n.a. 
Relaxation 1 6.00 n.a. 
 
Overall, the reported involuntary cognitions were highly emotional, with average 
intensity ratings across emotions from 4.83 to 6.33 on a 1-7 scale. Due to low numbers of 
involuntary cognitions that were associated with emotions other than happy or sad, no 
statistical analyses were performed to test for differences in emotional intensity. 
Quality 
 The large majority of involuntary cognitions (82.26%, n = 51) were predominantly 
visual in nature. A further 8.06% (n = 5) were predominantly verbal in nature, 4 (6.45%) 
were predominantly an emotional experience, 1 was a bodily sensation, and 1 could not be 
coded into any of these categories.  
Type  
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 For more than half of the involuntary cognitions (61.29%, n = 38), participants 
indicated that the content was a memory of a specific event that had occurred in their lives. 
Thus, the remaining 24 involuntary cognitions were not memories. These non-memories were 
classified into the Type categories. Table 2 presents the frequency for each category, as well 
as an example.  
 
Table 2. The type of non-memory involuntary cognitions with their frequency and an 
example for each.  
Type Frequency 
Daydream 7 
Example: 
I sometimes see a person with whom I might be in love, we are in a room and he looks at me 
and I have the feeling that he honestly thinks that he loves me. Besides us no one else is in the 
room. I have several feelings with it, on the one hand it’s very beautiful to me, and on the 
other hand it’s not, because in theory I shouldn’t have feelings for him. Still I think it’s 
beautiful, when the image appears. 
Worst case scenario 5 
Example: 
Last Friday I was at my parents’ house and there was no one else at home, only our 2 dogs 
were there. I was brushing/grooming one of them and the TV was on at the same time, where 
a movie was playing. Suddenly the image came to mind that my brother would not make it 
through the job application, that his world collapsed, including my parents’ and therefore of 
the entire family. There was a lot of pressure, because in times of this economic crisis as a 
[occupation] he would not get a new chance soon. After I had let the image come over me, a 
worried and jaded feeling came over me, also because it could come true. There was indeed a 
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chance that he would not make it. Of course you take this into account, but still. 
Future event 5 
Example: 
The location is [city name] and I’m there with my future friends. It’s about the art academy 
where I’m going in [month] it is an image instead of a memory. This means a lot to me 
because I really want it. I have positive thought with it. I’m happy but also a little insecure of 
whether I will be able to do it. 
Hypothetical reconstruction 4 
Example: 
On the occasion of break-in at home. Backyard, 2 burglars, walking through the backyard to 
the backdoor, seeing exactly how they would have done it. It happens at night. Does not 
really mean anything to me, I try to ignore it. It evokes feelings of fear, doubt whether they 
will come back again and if it really happened this way. Desire to see the movie in real life so 
that I really know how it happened.  
Rumination 3 
Example: 
When I’m alone then often memories come up of my relation that ended 2 weeks ago. I mostly 
have this when I’m alone, then I start wallowing in my head and then memories come up. Or 
when I hear a specific music track that is associated with a memory or that I encounter things 
that remind me of the 4.5 year relationship. So my ex is involved in this. And it takes place 
mostly at night when I’m alone in my room and don’t have distraction from other people. It 
evokes mixed feelings, feelings of loss but also negative feelings about everything that went 
wrong and how much it has hurt me. I often am furious but I can also burst into tears 
because it has become such a mess. And I often have to tell myself: Come on, you deserve 
better. But that is often easier said than done. 
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Content 
 Half of all involuntary cognitions were about relationships. The next most frequent 
content concerned life threatening events (n = 15; 24.19%), followed by 
recreation/exploration (n = 8; 12.90%), achievement/mastery (n = 4; 6.45%) and guilt/shame 
involuntary cognitions (n = 2; 3.23%). Two involuntary cognitions were marked as not 
classifiable, as they did not fit into any of these categories. Table 3 presents an example of an 
involuntary cognition for each of the categories.  
 
Table 3. Examples of each of the Content categories.  
Content category Example 
Relationships (n = 31) There is not really a location. It is about my father whom I haven’t 
seen for about 14 years due to circumstances. I visualise him and 
me in a living room where we catch up on the last 14 years. The 
time when it plays is also unclear. The image means quite a lot to 
me. I would like to speak to him again and stuff, but it doesn’t work 
the way I want it to. The thoughts I have with this are tricky, 
because I don’t know what he is like now and how I will respond to 
that in turn. It evokes (again) feelings of being incomplete.  
Life threatening event 
(n = 15) 
A car came by very closely and I already saw myself lying under 
the car...I was alone. I felt very nervous afterwards.  
Recreation/exploration 
(n = 8) 
A holiday in America with a friend who was an au pair there for a 
year. We are cycling in the sun, on our way to the supermarket for 
groceries. This is sometime during the course of a weekday, on 
which my friend had to work as usual. This image makes me 
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happy, I think back to this holiday as very successful, a beautiful 
experience. It was also a unique experience. In relation to the 
weather in the Netherlands I think back to it and then I feel a little 
nostalgic. Especially the weather is important in this memory. Also 
the feeling of being happy, not to have to do things, just holiday 
and relaxation.  
Achievement/mastery 
(n = 4) 
I think a lot about a job interview that I have in the near future. It 
is set in a room at the [name university]. The feelings it evokes I 
can perhaps best describe as ‘healthy stress’. I think about it a lot 
because I really want to be admitted, but that also causes mild 
tensions. 
Guilt/shame (n = 2) Last week when I was lying in bed a shameful event came up 
spontaneously that was not nice at all at that moment. The same 
shameful feeling arose and I wanted mostly to cringe. 
 
Function 
 Of all involuntary cognitions, 22 (35.48%) were assigned to the category emotional 
processing, 15 (24.19%) to maintaining social relations, 12 (19.35%) to warning signals, 8 to 
mood repair (12.90%), and 5 (8.06%) to preparation. Table 4 provides examples for each 
category. 
 
Table 4. Examples for each of the Function categories. 
Category Example 
Emotional 
processing (n = 
Location: the apartment where I used to live with my boyfriend at the 
time. What happens: my sister and my boyfriend are making love. When 
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22) does it happen: when I was out working. It is something that I hadn’t 
wanted to know. That it happened is already bad enough, but I hadn’t 
wanted to know. Sometimes I don’t care at all, sometimes I feel so 
betrayed, then I see myself again at Easter giving my boyfriend and sister 
an Easter egg  and hearing myself say: “For the two people I love the 
most.” That my boyfriend cheated on me is not even the problem, but that 
my sister could so easily betray me I really cannot understand.  
Maintaining 
social relations 
(n = 15) 
A good friend – that I like very much by the way – who has been a regular 
fellow passenger on the train. She often sat across from me and sometimes 
I see her in my mind, even though in reality no one is sitting across from 
me. A visualised memory of those travels, which do me good. 
Warning signal 
(n = 12) 
Memory: I once had my toe stuck between something which made the nail 
almost fall off. The doctor then removed the nail and it looked horrible for 
a while. Every time I’m wearing thongs on the bicycle / walk behind a 
grocery cart I’m afraid that my toe will get stuck between. There is no 
special location / people present / event. Just the startle moment and the 
image of the bloody toe. It always frightens me and I’m scared it will 
happen again, it’s not that I’m afraid of the pain, but the way it looked 
just gives me the creeps. Then I don’t feel comfortable at all for a moment. 
Non-memory: Someone is holding something valuable in their hand and I 
see in my mind how the objects falls down on the floor. Sometimes it’s just 
a bottle of wine held by my friend and I feel like I need to be vigilant and 
be ready to catch the bottle. 
Mood repair (n In [city] at the quay during the [event]. Together with a colleague a 
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= 8) meeting with a group of guys. It happened last year. We chat some and 
then party on for a long time all together. Evokes feelings of joy because it 
was a lot of fun and hoping to run into them again this year. 
Preparation (n = 
5) 
It’s more thoughts than experiences. Because I study in [country] but am 
from [other country], I think about my parents a lot lately and thoughts of 
them come to mind. Partly I wonder what they are doing now and partly I 
think about what it would be like if they wouldn’t be there anymore, 
because they are near their 70s already. Then I do wonder whether I will 
be able to say that I have spent enough time with them. This is not 
necessarily negative for me. I’m thinking about them a lot and actively 
take on things, which makes me feel that we ARE spending an intensive 
amount of time together because I realise that the time together can end.  
 
Self-descriptions 
 The number of positive self-descriptions was significantly correlated with 
psychopathology, r = -.31, p = .009, but was not associated with any of the other measures. 
The number of negative self-descriptions was significantly correlated with psychopathology, 
r = .43, p < .001, the number of negative involuntary cognitions, r = .32, p = .008, the number 
of sad involuntary cognitions, r = .36, p = .002, the level of sadness of these involuntary 
cognitions, r = .38, p = .001, the number of involuntary cognitions with guilt/shame content, r 
= .29, p = .016, and the number of involuntary cognitions that were assigned to the emotional 
processing function category, r = .38, p = .001. 
Psychopathology 
 SCL-90 scores were significantly correlated with the level of distress associated with 
cognition that participants reported as distressing, r = .25, p = .037, number of cognitions that 
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were associated with disgust, r = .29, p = .016, and the levels of disgust associated with those 
cognitions, r = .29, p = .015, number of cognitions in the form of bodily sensations, r = .322, 
p = .007, and the number of worst case scenario non-memory involuntary cognitions, r = .25, 
p = .037, and, as mentioned, the number of positive, r = -.31, p = .009, and negative self-
descriptions, r = .43, p < .001. Table 5 shows the Pearson correlations between each of the 
SCL-90 subscales (columns), and involuntary cognitions characteristics and self-descriptions 
(rows). Only variables with at least 1 significant correlation with the SCL-90 subscales are 
included. 
 
Table 5. Pearson correlations between the SCL-90 subscales, and characteristics of the 
involuntary cognitions and self-descriptions. 
 SOM OBS INT DEP ANX HOS PHO PAR PSY ADD 
Emotion 
Distress n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .275* .240* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Disgust n.s. .294* .308* n.s. n.s. .426**
* 
.330** n.s. n.s. .256* 
Love n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .289* n.s. 
Intensity 
Happiness n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -
.258* 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Distress .242* n.s. n.s. .259* .316*
* 
.244* n.s. .249* n.s. n.s. 
Disgust n.s. .301* .310* n.s. n.s. .409** .320** n.s. .251* .255* 
Love n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .289* n.s. 
Quality 
Bodily 
sensation 
.349*
* 
.307* .282* n.s. .385* .275* .532**
* 
n.s. n.s. .241* 
Type 
Worst case .290* n.s. n.s. n.s. .370* .340** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
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scenario * 
Ruminatio
n 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .316*
* 
.341*
* 
Content 
Life 
threatenin
g event 
n.s. .246** n.s. n.s. .316*
* 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Function 
Warning 
signal 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .318*
* 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Self-descriptions 
Positive n.s. -
.362** 
-
.358*
* 
-.236* n.s. -.275* -.248* n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Negative n.s. .427**
* 
.380*
* 
.436**
* 
n.s. .350** .291* .357*
* 
.295* .269* 
Note: SOM = somatization, OBS = obsessive compulsive, INT = interpersonal sensitivity, 
DEP = depression, ANX = anxiety, HOS = hostility, PHO = phobic anxiety, PAR = paranoid 
ideation, PSY = psychoticism, ADD = additional items. P-values * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001. 
 
Comparisons between involuntary memories vs involuntary non-memories 
The finding that nearly half of the reported involuntary cognitions were not memories 
was of great interest to us, particularly in light of the surprising lack of empirical research 
into non-memory involuntary cognitions. The relative proportions of memories and non-
memories therefore prompted us to consider the extent to which these two types of 
involuntary cognitions might overlap or differ in terms of their features, as well as the way in 
which they are subjectively experienced.  
Chi-square analyses were conducted to compare memories and non-memories on 
valence (positive and negative), associated emotions, quality, content, and function. A t-test 
was conducted to compare the levels of emotion (i.e., emotional intensity) of the emotions 
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associated with the involuntary cognitions. Memories versus non-memories were equally 
often positive or negative, and there was no difference in the associated emotions or the 
emotionality (i.e., rated level of emotion) of the two types of cognitions, all ps > .05. 
There was a significant difference in the content of the involuntary cognitions 
between memories and non-memories, χ2(5) = 15.71, p = .008, and a difference in the 
function, χ2(4) = 10.51, p = .033. The difference in quality approached significance, χ2(4) = 
9.19, p = .057. In regards to content, approximately half of all memory and non-memory 
involuntary cognitions were about relationships. After that, memories were most often about 
life-threatening events whereas non-memories were equally often about life-threatening 
events and achievement/mastery. That is, life-threatening events were twice as likely to be 
the content of memories as non-memories. Finally, none of the non-memories were about 
recreation/exploration, whereas about 21% of memories have this content.   
In terms of possible function, memory involuntary cognitions were most often coded 
as having the possible function of emotional processing and social relations. Further, this 
function was assigned to memory involuntary cognitions twice as often as was the function of 
mood recovery or warning signals. Similarly, the function of emotional processing was most 
often assigned to non-memory involuntary cognitions. In contrast to memories, non-
memories had the possible function of social relations, preparation, and warning signals 
equally often. Relatively speaking, the functions of emotional processing followed by social 
relations were assigned to memories and non-memories equally often. Memories tended to be 
associated with the possible function of mood repair relatively more often than non-
memories. Non-memories tended to be associated with the possible functions of preparation 
and warning signal relatively more often than memories. In fact, none of the memories were 
coded as having the function of preparation . 
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The large majority of memories were predominantly visual in nature, whereas only 
about two thirds of the non-memories were. This is perhaps not surprising because 
autobiographical memories by definition have a strong visual component whereas non-
memories could also exist of purely verbal thoughts (e.g., ruminations). 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to explore the occurrence of involuntary cognitions in 
everyday life using a bottom-up approach. We use the term ‘involuntary cognitions’ to refer 
to memories, thoughts, and mental images that pop up into mind spontaneously, without 
conscious effort to retrieve or produce them. To assess involuntary cognitions in everyday 
life, a PC administered structured interview was presented to an unselected group of 70 
university students, most of them female. The interview queried participants about 
involuntary memories, thoughts, and images from the past month. By adopting a bottom-up 
approach, the exploratory analysis was more or less free of guidance from any specific 
theoretical framework, and was not limited to one specific type of cognition. 
 In this sample, 67.14% of participants reported at least one involuntary cognition in 
the past month. In terms of qualities or characteristics, all cognitions were considered to have 
at least some emotional impact, and the predominant emotions were ‘happy’ and ‘sad’. In 
regard to sensory modality, 82.26% of the reported involuntary cognitions were rated as 
being predominantly visual in nature, which is in line with earlier research showing that the 
visual modality is often dominant in mental imagery (e.g., Speckens et al., 2007). Of all 
reported involuntary cognitions, only 61.29% were (autobiographical) memories, as indicated 
by the participants. This left us with 38.71% of ‘non-memories’, which were further 
categorized using available coding schemes and relevant descriptive literature (see Method 
section). The non-memories mainly consisted of daydreams, imagery of worst case scenarios, 
future events, hypothetical reconstructions of past events that were not solved for the 
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individual (i.e., ‘missing pieces’ in a coherent narrative), and verbal ruminations. These types 
of cognitions occurred more or less in equal numbers. 
 In terms of content, the three main categories that were observed were social relations 
(e.g., an image of a friend sitting across from you in the train), life-threatening events (e.g., a 
bloody accident), and recreation/exploration (e.g., relaxing in on top of a hill with a great 
view). Possible or hypothetical functions were identified based on available literature (see 
Method section). Our examination led us to conclude that around 33% of the involuntary 
cognitions reported could be functional for emotional processing, 25% for maintaining social 
relationships, 20% as warning signals, 10% in mood repair, and another 10% in preparing for 
future events. Analyses that compared memories and non-memories revealed surprisingly 
few differences. Memories and non-memories were comparable in terms of valence, 
emotions, and emotional intensity. This may suggest that for the individual, the distinction 
between memories and non-memories may not in fact be important, as both types of 
involuntary cognitions represent fairly similar experiences, at least in terms of the 
characteristics that were measured in this study. Further, for the life-threatening events 
category, intrusive cognitions were twice as likely to be memories as opposed to non-
memories, and there were no non-memories of the recreation/exploration categories. These 
findings may be methodological artefacts, because the inherent nature of the categories ‘life-
threatening events’ and ‘exploration/recreation’ have a strong associations with personal past 
experiences.  
For both memories and non-memories the most prevalent potential function was 
emotional processing. Mood repair was more often associated with memories than non-
memories, in line with previous evidence of the effectiveness of positive memory recall as a 
means by which to counter a sad mood state (e.g., Joormann & Siemer, 2004). Prevalent 
potential functions for non-memories were warning signals and preparation for future events. 
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For the potential function of preparation this is not surprising, as the cognition is about an 
event that has not happened yet and could therefore not be a memory (although it is likely 
that the information represented in the future oriented cognition heavily draws on information 
from past experiences; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). This potential function of a 
‘warning signal’ was identified from the literature on psychological trauma, in which it has 
been proposed that involuntary autobiographical memories of negative events may occur in 
situations in which cues are present that could signal or predict a repeat of the past experience 
(Ehlers et al., 2002). In our study, we identified memories that could be interpreted as serving 
the function of a warning signal. For example, one participant had experienced her foot 
getting stuck in the wheel when cycling, which resulted in a bloody toe. She experienced an 
involuntary memory of this toe whenever the risk of a repeat of this accident was present 
(e.g., walking close behind a grocery trolley). The finding in our sample that it was not only 
memories served that function of a warning signal may suggest that non-memories may 
function as warning signals for negative experiences even if the individual has not 
experienced a similar experience him/herself before. 
 In addition to involuntary cognitions, self-descriptions and psychopathology were 
assessed using the Twenty-Statement Test (Horton et al., 2009), and the SCL-90 (Ettema & 
Arrindell, 2003), respectively. Correlational analyses showed that whereas positive self-
descriptions (e.g., ‘I am smart’) were associated with psychopathology, they were not related 
to any characteristics of the involuntary cognitions. Negative self-descriptions (e.g., ‘I am 
ugly’), in contrast, were not only associated with levels of psychopathology, but also with the 
number of negative, mostly sadness-related involuntary cognitions, levels of sadness 
associated with the cognitions, a the number of guilt/shame cognitions, and the hypothetical 
function of emotional processing. This latter relationship may indicate that emotional 
processing of one or more negative experiences could be a main goal for individuals with a 
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negative self-image. This would be in line with the theoretical proposition that mental images 
are associated with an individual’s goals, which in turn are related to their self-image, 
according to the Self-Memory System (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). Higher scores on 
the SCL-90, indicating higher levels of psychopathology, were related to more distressing 
involuntary cognitions, and specifically higher numbers of disgust-related involuntary 
cognitions, greater levels of disgust, more involuntary cognitions involving bodily sensations, 
and more non-memories classified as worst case scenarios. Further, the SCL-90 subscales 
revealed many significant correlation with characteristics of involuntary cognitions and self-
descriptions, supportive of a theoretical link between psychopathology, involuntary 
cognitions, and the self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Some general observations were 
that most correlations were positive (except for the correlation with intensity of happiness 
associated with happy involuntary cognitions), suggesting that the experience of involuntary 
cognitions is mostly associated with poorer mental health, and not with positive mental 
wellbeing. Further, some variables showed significant relations across multiple subscales of 
the SCL-90, such as intrusive bodily sensations, involuntary cognitions associated with 
distress or disgust, and the intensity of the associated distress or disgust, lower numbers of 
positive self-descriptions and higher number of negative self-descriptions. Although it is 
tempting to engage in theoretical interpretation of these correlations as some appear very 
intuitive (e.g., a correlation between involuntary cognitions about life threatening events and 
the subscales Obsessive compulsive and Anxiety; and the function of warning signal and the 
Anxiety subscale) we should be extremely careful with any such interpretations as our 
findings await replication.   
Because an unselected sample was recruited, it is possible and even likely that some 
participants suffered from psychological symptoms (whether subclinical, or consistent with a 
clinical diagnosis – e.g., obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder) at the time of testing, 
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which may in part explain these findings. Further, the majority of participants in our sample 
was female and therefore the results may be more representative of females than males. 
Future research with samples of individuals who have been screened for the presence of 
psychopathological conditions will test this possibility. 
 This study has several limitations. First, the advantages of using a bottom-up 
approach also come with methodological disadvantages. The coding schemes that were used 
were based on existing literature where possible, but were not available or suitable for all our 
study goals. Therefore, we constructed several classifications on face value (e.g., 
‘hypothetical reconstructions’). Overall inter-rater reliabilities for existing classifications 
varied from minimal (e.g., for quality coding) to moderate (e.g., type) to high (e.g., for 
content and self-descriptions). Therefore, the findings presented here are very preliminary 
and replication will be important. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, this approach allowed 
us to explore the phenomenon of involuntary cognitions in a way which resulted, in our 
opinion, in an intriguing pattern of findings. Further, the literature that was reviewed in the 
Introduction included different types of involuntary cognitions that have been identified in 
the cognitive and clinical literature. That is, involuntary autobiographical memories, 
involuntary semantic cognitions, and involuntary thoughts and images all come to mind 
unbidden, and in the case of cognitions of negative content or valence, are unwanted. 
However, our data showed that other mental phenomena, such as rumination and forms of 
mind wandering (e.g., daydreams) were sometimes similarly experienced as involuntary and 
spontaneous by our participants, even though in the literature rumination and daydreaming 
are typically not categorized as ‘intrusive’ or involuntary’ cognitions (although their onset 
may be spontaneous). Thus, it may be warranted to broaden our view of the types of 
cognitions that can potentially be experienced as involuntary to include rumination and forms 
of mind wandering. Second, the structured interview assessed only three ‘main’ involuntary 
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cognitions that occurred during the month preceding the study. This is likely to be a gross 
underestimation of the number of involuntary cognitions that occur daily (c.f.,  Kvavilashvili 
& Mandler, 2004; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), and frequency of occurrence of 
involuntary cognitions was not assessed which, although not the goal of this study, may be 
considered a limitation as cognitions with a high frequency of occurrence may also differ 
from low frequency cognitions. In addition, we did not assess triggers, which could have 
provided further information about the content and function of the involuntary cognitions. 
Relatedly, the involuntary cognitions that were reported all had some emotional 
impact (with means ranging from M = 4.83 to M = 6.33 on a scale from 1 to 7), which is 
likely at least partly due to a retrospective bias, such that more significant or emotional 
cognitions will be remembered whereas less significant or emotional cognitions, that are 
perhaps also more frequent, may be forgotten. Nevertheless, emotional cognitions may be 
more informative for some purposes as these are more likely to translate to behaviour (e.g., 
actually preparing for a future event, avoiding a negative consequence, etc.; Holmes & 
Mathews, 2005). Third, all cognitions that were reported were classified on all factors of 
interest (quality, type, content, and function), resulting in overlapping categories.  For 
example, a cognition with a function of maintaining social relations most likely overlaps with 
cognitions with a content of social relations, and cognitions for mood repair and cognitions 
about recreation/exploration likely overlap because of their positive valence. In light of this, 
the findings therefore need to be interpreted with caution. Finally, although the findings of 
this study show that there are many different types of involuntary cognitions, each with its 
own specific quality and characteristics and potential function, the nature of this study 
prevents us from drawing firm conclusions about the relations between these characteristics. 
Prospective and experimental studies are needed to test their empirical significance. 
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 To summarise, we present several interesting findings that provide food for thought 
for both clinical and cognitive psychologists who are interested in involuntary cognitions. 
The main goal of this study was to explore the quality, type, content, and function of 
involuntary cognitions in everyday life, without limiting focus to a specific subtype (e.g., 
autobiographical memories, positive or negative cognitions). One of the main findings was 
that involuntary memories differ very little from other involuntary cognitions on important 
markers such as valence and emotionality. This raises the question as to whether the 
distinction between memories and non-memories is actually an important one in the 
experience of the individual. Interestingly, specific relationships emerged between 
psychopathology and negative self-descriptions, as well as the characteristics of cognitions. 
In our view, these are exciting preliminary findings that we hope may spark future research 
into involuntary cognitions and their specific impact on the individual’s experience and 
behaviour. 
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